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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Matthew

the

h

conviction for first degree stalking because the district court erred by abandoning its
order for a competency hearing after finding reason to doubt Mr. Pridgen's competence,
accepting Mr. Pridgen's guilty plea to first degree stalking when the court had no
jurisdiction over that charge, and denying Mr. Pridgen's motion to withdraw his guilty
plea even though the plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary or supported by
consideration.

In response, the State argues that the court acted with its discretion

"with respect to its determinations regarding [Mr.] Pridgen's competency" (Resp.
Br., p.5) and when it denied his motion to withdraw his plea, and that the district court
had jurisdiction to accept the plea because Mr. Pridgen waived his right to a preliminary
hearing when he pied guilty.

As discussed below, those arguments are unavailing.

Further, the State has failed to dispute (or even mention) the fact that Mr. Pridgen
should never have been bound over on battery with the intent to commit a felony in the
first place, which means his plea was not supported by consideration and could not
have been knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

Because of that error alone, not to

mention the other mistakes in this case, the Court should vacate Mr. Pridgen's
conviction.

1

ISSUES
discretion by abandoning its order for a
reason to doubt Mr. Pridgen's competence?
II.

Is Mr. Pridgen's guilty plea void because the district court had no jurisdiction over
the improperly-amended third Information charging Mr. Pridgen with first degree
stalking?

Ill.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Mr. Pridgen's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea because Mr. Pridgen had just reasons to withdraw his
plea?

2

ARGUMENT

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Abandoning Its Order For A Competency
Evaluation After Finding Reason To Doubt Mr. Pridgen's Competence
Idaho Code § 18-211 requires that the district court order a competency
evaluation after finding reason to doubt a defendant's competence. The district court
here found reason to doubt Mr. Pridgen's competence when it ordered his competency
evaluations, and therefore abused its discretion by abandoning its order for a
competency evaluation and accepting Mr. Pridgen's plea without first determining
whether he was competent.
Without disputing that I.C. § 18-211 places a mandatory duty on the district court
to determine whether a defendant is competence if there is reason to doubt his
competence, the State claims that "the district court acted well within its discretion with
respect to its determinations regarding [Mr.] Pridgen's competency."
(capitalization altered).)

The State has missed the point.

(Resp. Br., p.5

Mr. Pridgen does not

challenge the determinations the district court actually made.

but rather the

determinations that the district court failed to make. After determining that there was
reason to doubt Mr. Pridgen's competence, I.C. § 18-211 required that the court order
an evaluation and determine either that Mr. Pridgen was or was not competent.
I.C. § 18-211 ("Whenever there is reason to doubt the defendant's fitness to proceed"
under I.C. § 18-210, "the court shalt order a competency evaluation to determine "the
mental condition of the defendant to assist counsel with defense or understand the
proceedings") (emphasis added). Instead, the district court did nothing. That inaction
ran afoul of I.C. § 18-211.
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The State's arguments to the contrary are unconvincing.
a reason

doubt Mr. Pridgen's

First, it notes that the
to justify the

court not found reason to doubt Mr. Pridgen's

Br.,

competence, counsel wonders why else the court would have ordered a competency
evaluation-not just once, but twice (Confidential Exs., pp.2-3; 3/31/14 Tr., p.26, L.15 p.28, L.21, p.30, Ls.18-22)-and why else Judge Luster would have told Mr. Pridgen
that, if he did not cooperate with Dr. Hayes's evaluation, "I have to go through
appointing guardians"?

(3/31/14 Tr., p.29, L.25 - p.30, L.2).

Second, the State's

attempt to fault Mr. Schwartz his ''vague [sic] expressed concerns" about Mr. Pridgen's
competency is irrelevant.

(Resp. Br., p.10.) The district court found those concerns

sufficient to doubt Mr. Pridgen's competence, and so the State's opinion of their
sufficiency is beside the point.
p.28, L.21, p.30, Ls.18-22.)

(Confidential Exs., pp.2-3; 3/31/14 Tr., p.26, L.15 Finally, Mr. Wirick's representation that Mr. Schwartz

intended to withdraw his motion for an evaluation because Dr. Hayes would not conduct
a "piecemeal" evaluation has no bearing on the ultimate question-whether the district
court satisfied its obligations under I.C. § 18-211 and whether Mr. Pridgen was actually
competent to stand trial. (See Resp. Br., p.10; 5/12/14 Tr., p.19, L.20-p.20, L.4.)
The State goes on to make its case for why Mr. Pridgen was in fact competent.
(Resp. Br., p.10.) It argues that "there is no indication in the record that [Mr.] Pridgen
was incompetent to stand trial or to enter a guilty plea," and then discusses evidence
that it believes shows that Mr. Pridgen is competent.

(Id.) The State fails to explain

how there is "no indication in the record" that Mr. Pridgen was not competent, in light of
Mr. Schwartz's declaration that he did not believe Mr. Pridgen was competent and his
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to stipulate as much. (See 3/31/14

, p.5, L.16 - p.9, L.5.) Regardless, had

court conducted an
was

Mr.

and

that

have raised

e

State's factual claims regarding Mr. Pridgen's competence in no way make up for the
factual findings the district court should have made.
The district court found reason to doubt Mr. Pridgen's competence, and there is
nothing in the record to indicate, nor did the court find, that there was no longer any
reason to doubt Mr. Pridgen's competence.

The district court's silence violated the

mandates of I.C. § 18-211, and in turn denied Mr. Pridgen his due process right to a fair
trial.

See State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 62 (2003), reh'g on other grounds,

140 Idaho 73 (2004).

II
Because The District Court Had No Jurisdiction Over The Improperly-Amended Third
Information Charging Mr. Pridgen With First Degree Stalking, Mr. Pridgen's Guilty Plea
Is Void
The third amended information in this case charged Mr. Pridgen with first degree
stalking, to which Mr. Pridgen pied guilty. First degree stalking is not a lesser included
offense of battery with the intent to commit a serious felony, the original charge, and the
prosecutor did not present the first degree stalking charge to the district court for a
finding of probable cause. In fact, at the beginning of this case, the district court found
there was no probable cause to bind over on first degree stalking.

Mr. Pridgen thus

argued in his opening brief that the district court had no jurisdiction to accept his guilty
plea to first degree stalking, and so the plea is void.

5

response, the State first appears to take issue with State v. Flegel,
(2011). (See Resp.

5

charging

1

According to the State, Flegel

is jurisdictionally invalid where the defendant was acquitted

of the charged offense at trial and the district court allowed a post-acquittal amendment
to a non-included offense," and "[t]hus, the jury's acquittal on the only valid charge
against Flegel ended the district court's jurisdiction over the case." (Id.) The State's
implication that the acquittal in Flegel had anything to do with its holding is meritless.
Although factually correct that Flegel involved a post-acquittal amendment to an
indictment, the Court's holding in no way turned on that fact. The Court only discussed
Flegel's acquittal on the original charge in the factual background section.

Flegel,

151 Idaho at 526. Not once did the Court's analysis mention Flegel's acquittal, nor did
the analysis turn on his acquittal.

Instead, the holding rested on the fact that the

amended charge had never been submitted to the grand jury. The introduction to Flegel
stated in whole:
This is an appeal from a conviction for the crime of sexual abuse of
a child under sixteen years of age charged in an amended indictment.
Because that crime had not been submitted to the grand jury and was not
an included offense of the crime of lewd conduct charged in the original
indictment, the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. We
therefore vacate the judgment of conviction and remand this case with
instructions to dismiss the case without prejudice.
Id. at 526. At the beginning of the analysis section, the Court summarized:

Because Sexual Abuse is not a lesser included offense of Lewd
Conduct, Flegel could only be validly charged by indictment with that
crime if the matter was resubmitted to a grand jury and it returned the
amended indictment. The prosecuting attorney had no authority to issue
an amended indictment for a crime that was not charged in the original
indictment and that was not an included offense of that crime.
Id. During its analysis, the Court again reiterated that
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The prosecutor had no authority to file an amended indictment charging a
crime that was not an included offense under the original indictment,
under either the statutory theory or the pleading theory. It is the grand
is
jury, not the
or the prosecutor, that must decide whether
probable cause to believe that Flegel committed the crime of Sexual
Abuse.
Id. at 530. And, finally, the Court concluded that "[n]ot having been issued by a grand

jury, the amended indictment was invalid, the district court never had subject matter
jurisdiction over Flegel's case regarding the charge of Sexual Abuse, and this case
must therefore be dismissed." Id. at 531. Flegefs holding, by its own terms, did not
turn on (or even consider) Flegel's acquittal.
The State next argues that "[i]t is well-settled that a valid plea of guilty, voluntarily
and understandingly given, waives all non-jurisdictional defects and defenses," and so
Mr. Pridgen waived his right to a preliminary hearing by pleading guilty to first degree
stalking. (Resp. Br., p.13 (citing State v. Dunlap, 123 Idaho 396, 399 (Ct App. 1993)
and State v. Fowler, 105 Idaho 642, 643 (Ct App. 1983)1.) The State overlooks the fact
that this is a jurisdictional defect

IDAHO

CONST. art. I,§ 8; Flegel, 151 Idaho at 530-31;

State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 841 (2011). And because subject matter jurisdiction '"is

so fundamental to the propriety of a court's actions ... [it] can never be waived or
consented to."' Lute, 150 Idaho at 840 (quoting State v. Urrabazzo, 150 Idaho 158,
163-64 (2010)).

The State relies on Dunlap and Fowler to support its argument that Mr. Pridgen could
waive jurisdiction in this case. Those cases only stand for the proposition that a guilty
plea waives non-jurisdictional defects. See Dunlap, 123 Idaho at 399; Fowler, 105
Idaho at 643. Although the defendants in those cases claimed defects with their
preliminary hearings, they did not argue that the defects deprived the court of
jurisdiction. See generally Dunlap, 123 Idaho 369; Fowler, 105 Idaho 642.
1
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had no authority to amend the information, and Mr. Pridgen could not
on

was a nullity,

the

by
Mr.

no

court

plea, and the plea is void.

111.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying Mr. Pridgen's Motion To Withdraw
His Guilty Plea Because The Plea Was Not Knowing, Intelligent, And Voluntary, and
Was Not Supported By Valid Consideration
Mr. Pridgen moved to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing in this case. In
his opening brief, he argued that the district court abused its discretion by denying that
motion because the plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; Mr. Pridgen
showed just reasons to withdraw his plea and the State failed to show it would suffer
prejudice; and the plea was not supported by valid consideration.

In response, the

State flatly claims that the district court's decision was sound, without squarely
addressing the reasons Mr. Pridgen has given to prove his plea was not knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary and that there were just reasons to withdraw his plea.
(See Resp. Br., pp.14-19.) The State's arguments are thus unconvincing.
The most compelling reason Mr. Pridgen should be allowed to withdraw his plea
is that he was unlawfully bound over on a specific intent crime, battery with the intent to
commit a serious felony, which everyone at the preliminary hearing mistakenly believed
was a general intent crime. (8/13/2013 Tr., p.64, L.17-p.67, L.8.) Because the district
court clearly stated that there was no specific intent-it dismissed the attempted rape
and burglary charges for that very reason-there was no probable cause to bind

8

Pridgen over on battery with the intent to commit a serious felony.

(8/13/201 3

11
disagree on

point (See Resp. Br., pp.1

it

did not even mention that point in its briefing, even though it formed the crux of
Mr. Pridgen's argument on this issue. (See id.; App. Br., pp.23-26.) The State has thus
failed to give any explanation as to how a plea could be knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary when the State's only bargaining chip was a felony charge which the
defendant should never have been bound over on in the first place and which the
defendant was clearly confused about

(8/13/2014 Tr., p.8, Ls.12-23, p.13, Ls.1-8,

p.16, L.21 - p.17, L.2, p.20, Ls.21-23.) The district court's finding that Mr. Pridgen's
testimony at the withdrawal hearing was evasive in no way negates this fact.

(See Resp. Br., p.18 (citing 8/13/14 Tr., p.32, L.16 - p.33, L.23).) Had the district court
learned of this mistake before taking the plea, the State could not have charged
Mr. Pridgen with any felony, Mr. Pridgen never would have pied guilty, and the district
court would never have accepted this plea.
With respect to Mr. Pridgen's claim that his plea was not supported by valid
consideration, the State first mistakenly contends that Mr. Pridgen argued that there
was no consideration because the court did not have jurisdiction over the third amended
information, and then claims that its arguments on the jurisdiction issue show there was
in fact valid consideration.

(See Resp. Br., p.19.)

In his opening brief, Mr. Pridgen

referred to Section 11 in support of his argument that "there was never probable cause to
hold Mr. Pridgen over on the battery with the intent to commit rape charge, and so [the]
State could not fulfill the promise to 'amend' that charge down to first degree stalking in

9

way." (App. Br., pp.27-28.) Counsel takes partial responsibility
II

not

over on
Regardless, Mr. Pridgen clearly explained why there was no consideration, which
has nothing to do with the jurisdiction issue:
[T]here was never probable cause to hold Mr. Pridgen over on the battery
with the intent to commit rape charge, and so that State could not fulfill the
promise to "amend" that charge down to first degree stalking in any
meaningful way. Moreover, the State's amendment of the battery charge
to the felony stalking charge was undeniably the very crux of this plea
agreement. The only consideration left in this case was the State's
dismissal of three misdemeanor charges and possible probation
recommendation, which no defendant would accept as consideration for a
felony carrying a possible five-year sentence.
(See id.)

Just as in its earlier arguments regarding whether Mr. Pridgen's plea was

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary or whether he had a just reason to withdraw his plea,
the State has not disputed that the court should not have bound over on the battery
charge or otherwise explained what consideration supported the plea given that error.
The battery charge-which should never have existed-could not actually be amended
down in consideration for Mr. Pridgen's guilty plea. The plea is thus unenforceable

10

d
proceedings.
DATED this 2nd day of December, 2015.

'7,,z~~JLd <-<.___ _
MAY~WALDRON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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